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Abstract. This paper gives the SNAP and SPAN ontologies relating to
recognizing variable vista spatial environments, namely, SNAPVis and
SPANVis. It proposes that recognizing spatial environments is a judg-
ment process of whether the perceived environment is compatible with
the remembered one. Their compatibility is based on both their spa-
tial changes and the commonsense knowledge of objects’ stabilities. The
recognition result is determined by whether such changes are due to
possible movements of related objects or not. This paper presents six
SNAPVis ontologies: fiat boundary, near region, fiat parts (the three
are fiat regions), classic topologic relations, qualitative orientations, and
qualitative distances (the three are spatial relations) and one SPANVis
ontology: the commonsense knowledge of stability of spatial objects. The
paper briefly presents a cognitive map of vista spatial environments and
the process of recognition.
1 An Introduction
“The structure of space can be described from the point of view of behavior”,
cf. (Piaget, 1954, pp. 212). Vista spatial environments refer to Montello’s vista
space, cf. (Montello, 1993), that is “projectively as large as the human body and
that can be apprehended from one place without necessary locomotion”. Typical
vista spaces are single rooms, offices, small valleys, etc.
Vista spatial environments are dynamic. For example, chairs and books are
often placed here and there in your office, your home. However, you can recognize
your office, your home.
Intuitively, we recognize a place not by checking everything in it. The air
in the room, a sheet of paper, an apple and contents in the dustbin do not
help to recognize the room. This paper addresses the task of recognizing spatial
environments by asking what exists in an environment that makes it be that
environment. It proposes formal ontologies for recognizing vista spatial environ-
ments by extending the RCC8 theory, cf. (Randell et al., 1992).
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2 The State of the Art
Recognizing spatial environments relates to perception, cognition and corre-
sponding linguistic expressions, which are all fiat, cf. (Smith, 2001). It has noth-
ing to do with finger print checking, molecule analysis or DNA testing. There-
fore this paper strictly distinguishes fiat ontologies from bona fide ontologies, cf.
(Smith and Varzi, 2000).
Rosch, et al. (1976) reported that humans recognize single objects at the basic
level category. At this level (of granularity) humans find it easiest to name objects
and recognize them the fastest. This introduces the question of the formation
of object constancy: If you look at an apple for one minute, how do you know
that the apple you saw at the beginning of the minute is the same apple you saw
at the end of the minute? Piaget (1954) Marr and Nishihara (1978) and Rock
(1983) suggested that information about spatial relations of an object or parts of
an object are important in object constancy. This is consistent with the case of a
brain impaired patient: Wilson, et al. (1999) reported a woman, LE, who suffered
from a rare memory problem. LE cannot retrieve images from her memory, thus,
she cannot distinguish two windows whose glasses have different images and she
even has difficulty in recognizing her husband’s face. What she can retrieve are
only contours of objects. On the other hand, she can locate objects. Amazingly,
she can recognize spatial environments, such as her home1. This shows that
recognizing spatial environments does not require much information about single
objects but rather the spatial relations among them.
The starting point of this paper is that objects in an environment are recog-
nized at basic level categories and that spatial relations among them are known.
This paper presents ontologies for recognizing a vista spatial environment on
this basis.
This paper follows the philosophy that dynamic spatial ontology should com-
bine two distinct types of inventory of the entities and relationships in reality: on
the one hand, a purely spatial ontology supporting snapshot views of the world at
successive instants of time: SNAP; on the other hand, a purely spatiotemporal
ontology of change and process: SPAN, cf. (Grenon and Smith, 2004). Recog-
nizing a vista spatial environment relates its two snapshots (one is remembered
in the mind, the other is currently perceived) and the spatiotemporal relation
between them: can they (or to what extent can they) participate in the same
SPAN?
The snapshot of a spatial environment in mind is termed a cognitive map in
the literature, cf. (Tolman, 1948; Kuipers, 1978). Structures of cognitive maps
concerning environmental spaces and geographical spaces are hierarchical, cf.
(Kosslyn et al., 1974; Siegel and White, 1975; Steven and Coupe, 1978; Hirtle
and Jonides, 1985; Tversky, 1991). This paper proposes that the structure of
the cognitive map of a vista spatial environment is also hierarchical and this
hierarchy is revealed in the selection of reference objects in spatial linguistic de-
1 Personal communication with Allan Baddeley, Sofia, Bulgaria, July, 2003.
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scriptions: a location object is at lower or the same level in the hierarchy as its
reference object(s). For example, if people say “the cup is on the table”, then
in their cognitive map the cup is located lower than or at the same position as
the table in the hierarchy. This paper proposes that the level of an object in the
hierarchy of a person’s cognitive map is determined by commonsense knowledge
of its stability in this environment, which is a SPAN ontology.
There is some work on representations of spatial relations among extended ob-
jects, cf. (de Laguna, 1922; Randell et al., 1992; Clementini and Di Felice, 1997;
Goyal, 2000;Schmidtke, 2001;Schmidtke, 2003).Thispaperbriefly introduces topo-
logical definitions of subjective distance and orientation relations between regions
for the task of recognizing vista spatial environments.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3 and section 4 present SNAPVis
and SPANVis for recognizing vista spatial environments; section 5 presents the
structure of a cognitive map; section 6 briefly outlines the recognition issues;
section 7 summarizes the paper.
3 SNAPVis for Recognizing Vista Spatial Environments
Following Smith’s ontologies of SNAP-SPAN, this article proposes SNAPVis and
SPANVis for vista spatial environments. SNAPVis is an ontology for continuants
of vista spatial environments; SPANVis is an ontology for occurrents of vista
spatial environments.
3.1 Fiat Regions
Fiat Boundaries. When we look around, we do not see clusters of atoms or
molecules. Rather, we perceive objects and name them at categories. A corre-
spondence between perception and its language description has been proposed
by Tversky and Lee (1999) as follows: to the extent that space is schematized sim-
ilarly in language and cognition, language will be successful in conveying space
(the Schematization Similarity Conjecture). Thus, objects recognized through
perception are fiat in the sense that they relate to both the objects and hu-
man cognition. The fiat boundary of an object refers to its conceptual boundary
through perception and the perceptual object is named at the basic level cate-
gory, such as rooms, windows, doors, furniture, etc. A fiat boundary is an instan-
tiation of a basic level category. Fiat boundaries are named by the object names
at basic level categories (may be followed by a natural number to distinguish
different instances of the same category), such as “room”, “room1”, “window2”
and capital lettered names are used as basic level categories, such as “ROOM”,
“WINDOW”. ‘BasicLevel(w)’ is a predicate standing for “w is a basic level
category”; ‘FiatBoundary(x)’ is a predicate which stands for “x is a kind of fiat
boundary at the basic level category”; ‘Constituent(x, w)2’ is a predicate for “x
is an instantiation of the category of w”.
2 This terminology ‘Constituent’ is adopted from (Grenon and Smith, 2004).
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Formulae in this paper have the form of “(Q x|p • q)”, Q is the quantifier, x
is the bound variable, p is the constraint of x, and q is the predicate. It is read
as “for all x satisfying p, q holds (or there is x satisfying p such that q).” Any
fiat boundary of an extended object belongs to a class.
∀x∃w • FiatBoundary(x) → Constituent(x, w) ∧ BasicLevel(w) (1)
A fiat boundary is an instantiation of only one basic level category:
∀x, w1, w2|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ Constituent(x, w1) ∧ BasicLevel(w1) (2)
∧Constituent(x, w2) ∧ BasicLevel(w2)
•w1 = w2
Fiat boundaries of the same basic level category are indistinguishable in isolation.
The predicate ‘CanBeTheSame(x, y)’ stands for “x and y are indistinguishable
in isolation.”
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y)• (3)
(∃w|BasicLevel(w) • Constituent(x, w) ∧ Constituent(y, w))
→ CanBeTheSame(x, y)
Fiat boundaries of different basic level categories must be different fiat bound-
aries.
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y)• (4)
(∀w1, w2|Constituent(x, w1) ∧ Constituent(y, w2)
∧BasicLevel(w1) ∧ BasicLevel(w2)
•w1 = w2 → ¬CanBeTheSame(x, y))
Fiat Parts. Humans recognize spatial objects by perceiving their partial im-
ages, cf. (Buelthoff and Edelman, 1992; Humphrey and Khan, 1992;
Tarr, 1995).
‘RecognizablePart(y, x)’ stands for “y is a recognizable part of fiat boundary
x, which can be used to recognize x”; ‘recognition(y)’ is a function which returns
the basic level category of a recognizable part y.
Recognizable parts of a fiat boundary are used to identify its basic level
category:
∀x, y, w|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ RecognizablePart(y, x) (5)
∧BasicLevel(w) • w = recognition(y) → Constituent(x, w)
Recognizable parts of an object are often different. Your face seen from the
front is completely different from that seen from the left side, though both
are recognizable parts of the face. ‘front(x)’,‘left(x)’,‘right(x)’ and ‘behind(x)’
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Fig. 1. Fiat extension of spatial region: the near region of the desk
stand for the front, left, right and behind recognizable parts of the fiat boundary
x, respectively. They are linguistic fiat after (Smith, 2001).
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) • y = front(x) → RecognizablePart(y, x) (6)
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) • y = left(x) → RecognizablePart(y, x) (7)
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) • y = right(x) → RecognizablePart(y, x) (8)
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) • y = behind(x) → RecognizablePart(y, x) (9)
Fiat Extensions of Spatial Regions. For a description like “the chair is near
the writing-desk”, it is normally explained that the spatial relation between
the chair and the writing-desk is near. This article takes an alternative view as
follows: the fiat boundary of the chair is overlapped with the near region of the
desk, shown in Figure 1.
The Near Function. If x is a fiat boundary, then near(x) is a fiat region
which denotes the nearby region of x. The closure of the near(x) region is a
ring which has two boundaries: an inner boundary and a fiat outer boundary.
The inner boundary coincides with the fiat boundary x, as we would not say
an object is near to a region when it is already connected with the region. The
outer boundary is determined by both the objects and human cognition. So the
near(x) region is fiat and its closure is externally connected with the region3 x.
The near function is similar with the ‘penumbra region’ in (Freksa, 1981) and
‘Egg-Yolk’ in (Cohn and Gotts, 1996), however, it can be applied recursively.
That is, a near region can have its own near region. Formal definitions are given
in the appendix, as detailed discussion is beyond the scope of the article.
The near function is only a special case of fiat extensions of fiat boundaries.
“A is nearer to B than to C” can be further explained as: there is a fiat extension
of A which is connected with the fiat boundary B and is disconnected with the
fiat boundary C. The function of ‘fiat extensionn(x)’ is defined as:
3 The fiat boundary of a 3-dimensional object is a 2-dimensional region.
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fiat extensionn(x)def=x ∪ near(x) ∪ near2(x) ∪ · · · ∪ nearn(x) (10)
Then:
∀x, y, z|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y) (11)
∧FiatBoundary(z) • nearer(x, y, z)def=
∃n • C(fiat extensionn(x), y) ∧ DC(fiat extensionn(x), z)
where C and DC mean “connected with” and “disconnected with” respectively
(following the notions in RCC).
3.2 Spatial Relations
Spatial relations include classic topologic relations, qualitative distance relations
and qualitative orientation relations, cf. (Stock, 1997).
Classic Topologic Relations. Classic topological relations depict connected-
ness relations between two regions, as described by RCC8.
Qualitative Orientation Relations. The different observed recognizable parts
result in the orientation relations between the observer and the object. When
you are watching television (i.e., you are looking at the recognizable part of the
TV set which provides sequences of images), you know that you are in front of
the TV set.
Such orientation relations can be formalized by a comparison of qualitative
distances: “the chair is in front of the desk” means that the chair is nearer to
the front fiat part of the desk than its other fiat parts, shown in Figure 2.
‘Front(x, y)’ stands for “x is in front of y or in the front of y”:
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y) • Front(x, y)def= (12)
∀z|RecognizablePart(z, y) • z = front(y) → nearer(x, front(y), z)
Fig. 2. The qualitative orientation relation is explained by the comparison of qualita-
tive distances among fiat extension region of the location object and fiat parts of the
reference object
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Similarly, ‘Left(x, y)’ stands for “x is located left of y or left to y”; ‘Right(x, y)’
for “x is located right of y or right to y”; ‘Behind(x, y)’ for “x is located behind
y or at behind part of y”:
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y) • Left(x, y)def= (13)
∀z|RecognizablePart(z, y) • z = left(y) → nearer(x, left(y), z)
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y) • Right(x, y)def= (14)
∀z|RecognizablePart(z, y) • z = right(y) → nearer(x, right(y), z)
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y) • Behind(x, y)def= (15)
∀z|RecognizablePart(z, y) • z = behind(y) → nearer(x, behind(y), z)
Qualitative Distance Relations. Qualitative distance relations specify the
‘DC’ relation in RCC by giving qualitative distance relations such as ‘NR’(near),
‘PR’ (penumbra far-or-near), and ‘FR’(far), as we seldom use an expression like
“the chair is disconnected with the desk”, but instead we give qualitative distance
relations, such as “the chair is near the desk”.
Fiat boundary x near fiat boundary y is defined as: x is disconnected with y
and overlapped with the near region of y:
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y)• (16)
NR(x, y)def=DC (x, y) ∧ O(x, near(y))
Fiat boundary x penumbra far or near y is defined as: x is disconnected with
y and externally connected with its near region:
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y)• (17)
PR(x, y)def=DC (x, y) ∧ EC (x, near(y))
Fiat boundary x far away from y is defined as: x is disconnected with y and
its near region:
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y)• (18)
FR(x, y)def=DC (x, y) ∧ DC (x, near(y))
It is obvious that FR, PR, NR are pairwise disjoint. FR, PR, NR also jointly
exhausts the DC relation, as shown below:
∀x, y|FiatBoundary(x) ∧ FiatBoundary(y)• (19)
DC (x, y) ≡ NR(x, y) ∨ PR(x, y) ∨ FR(x, y)
Proof sketch: For all fiat boundaries x and y
NR(x, y) ∨ PR(x, y) ∨ FR(x, y)
[(16), (17), (18)]
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Fig. 3. The ten topological relations RCC10 for vista spatial environments. The dis-
connected (DC) relation in RCC8 is specified by three qualitative distance relations:
far (FR), penumbra far-or-near (PR) and near (NR)
def= DC (x, y) ∧ O(x, near(y)) ∨ DC (x, y) ∧ EC(x, near(y))
∨DC (x, y) ∧ DC (x, near(y))
[(q ∧ a) ∨ (q ∧ b) ∨ (q ∧ c) ≡ q ∧ (a ∨ b ∨ c))]
≡ DC (x, y) ∧ (O(x, near(y)) ∨ EC (x, near(y)) ∨ DC (x, near(y)))
[Definition of EC and DC in RCC]
≡ DC (x, y) ∧ (O(x, near(y)) ∨ (C(x, near(y)) ∧ ¬O(x, near(y)))
∨¬C(x, near(y)))
[p ∨ (s ∧ t) ≡ (p ∨ s) ∧ (p ∨ t)]
≡ DC (x, y) ∧ (O(x, near(y)) ∨ ¬C(x, near(y)) ∨ C(x, near(y)))
∧(O(x, near(y)) ∨ ¬C(x, near(y)) ∨ ¬O(x, near(y)))
[p ∨ ¬p ≡ T ; T ∨ p ≡ T ; T ∧ T ≡ T ; q ∧ T ≡ q]
≡ DC (x, y)
This paper therefore proposes a new RCC10 by splitting the DC of RCC8
into three qualitative distance relations for vista spatial recognition. The con-
ceptual neighborhoods network, after the notion in (Freksa, 1991), of RCC10 is
shown in Figure 3.
4 SPANVis for Recognizing Vista Spatial Environments
4.1 The Stability
The stability of a fiat boundary is commonsense knowledge about the spatiotem-
poral property of the fiat boundary, which affects the selection of reference ob-
jects in spatial linguistic descriptions. For example, we neither say “the table is
352 T. Dong
Fig. 4. (a) shows the linguistic reference relations; (b) shows the partial order lattice
of direct reference pairs that is generated from (a)
under the book” nor “the wall is behind the picture”. Because normally books
and pictures are less stable than tables and walls, locating an object by a less
stable object provides little information about its location. If a pilot in a plane
has lost his current location information, he expects something like “you are
above the South Pole” not “you are in your plane”. ‘stability(x)’ stands for “the
stability of fiat boundary x.”
4.2 The Partial Order Lattice of References
Given a set of spatial linguistic descriptions about a snapshot layout of an envi-
ronment, the direct reference pair (A, B) is defined as such:
(1) A is used as the reference to B and there is no third object C such that
(A, C) and (C, B);
(2) B is not used as the reference to A.
All of the direct reference pairs form a partial order lattice. ‘POL(pl)’ stand-
ing for “pl is a partial order lattice”. I define here for convenience: ‘top level(pl)’,
‘second level(pl)’, ‘third level(pl)’ and ‘fourth level(pl)’ stands for “top level,
second level, third level and forth level spatial objects in pl, respectively”. Ob-
jects that are lower than the fourth level cannot help to recognize the room,
therefore, they are neglected.
4.3 An Example
Given the spatial linguistic descriptions of a remembered scenario, RS, as follows:
the door is in the wall and opposite to the window; the window is in the wall and
opposite to the door; the writing-desk is next to the window; the bookshelf is
close to the wall and near the window; the couch is on the left of the door;
the balloon is in front of the writing-desk; the tea-table is before the couch, tea-
cups are on the tea-table; the table is near the wall and on the right, if you
come through the door, linguistic reference relations are shown in Figure 4(a).
Then, its partial order lattice of stability, plRS , can be generated as shown in
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Figure 4(b). top level(plRS) = {room}, second level(plRS) = {window, door},
third level(plRS) = {writingdesk, bookshelf, table, couch}, fourth level(plRS)
= {balloon, teatable}.
5 The Cognitive Map of Vista Spatial Environments
To recognize your office, you do not pay attention to the location of apples,
books, pens, etc., because they are too un-stable and their locations cannot help
you to decide whether it is your target room. Cognitive maps of a vista space
only include some of the objects in it.
Foos (1980) investigated constructing cognitive maps from language descrip-
tions. Talmy (1983) discussed how language is effective for conveying spatial
information. He proposed that language schematizes space by selecting certain
aspects of a referent scene to represent the whole, while disregarding others. The
schematization of living spaces in (Ullmer-Ehrich, 1982) discarded all these small
objects, like apples, books, pens, etc. and only selected big ones. This suggests
that cognitive maps of vista spatial environments only include some objects in
the higher levels of the partial order lattice.
A cognitive map of a vista spatial environment, written as ‘CogM ’, is a rep-
resentation of the subjective knowledge a person has about the environment. It
has a hierarchical structure of spatial relations between fiat regions. The hier-
archy is formed according to the commonsense knowledge of stability of spatial
objects; and objects are anchored to reference objects at the same level or at the
neighboring level in the hierarchy. So, it is a partial-hierarchical structure af-
ter (McNamara, 1986). A cognitive map represents a set of SNAPVis ontologies
partial-hierarchically structured by an implicit SPANVis ontology: the stability.
Different persons may have different spatial knowledge; even the same person
will use different spatial knowledge for different tasks. When people recognize a
vista spatial environment, normally, the first thing they notice is the shape of
the environment, then these non-moveable objects, such as doors and windows,
if any, and then big furniture4. This paper assumes the following structure of a
cognitive map: its root is the room; its second level contains windows and doors;
its third level contains big furniture like desks, shelves; its fourth level contains
chairs, tea-tables, etc. Normally, objects in the top two levels are non-movable;
objects in the third level are seldom moved; objects in the fourth level are often
moved.
5.1 The Fiat Container
The fiat container of an object is a fiat region delineated by a spatial relation and
this object. For example, “in front of the desk” “behind the desk” “left of the
desk” and “right of the desk” delineate four fiat containers by orientation rela-
4 Personal communication with Jack Loomis, Bad Zwischenahn, Germany, August,
2003.
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tions and the desk. From the perspective of the fiat container, the spatial relation
between the location object and the reference object is interpreted as which fiat
container the location object is located in. An object is always located in fiat con-
tainers created by upper level or same level objects. ‘fiat container(refO, rel)’
or for short ‘SrefO(rel)’ stands for the fiat container delineated by the refer-
ence object refO and the spatial relation rel, which can be one of the RCC10
relations or an orientation relation. “.objects” is an operator of a fiat container
which returns the set of objects that are located in this fiat container. For ex-
ample, fiat container(desk1,NR).objects = {chair1}(Sdesk1(NR).objects =
{chair1}) stands that chair1 is located in the near region of desk1; similarly,
fiat container(desk1,Front).objects = {chair1} (Sdesk1(Front).objects =
{chair1}) stands that chair1 is located in front of or the front part of desk1.
5.2 Fiat Containers for Locations
The location of an object refers to the fiat container where the object is located.
‘location distance(x , refO) = relRCC10 ’ is a function that returns a RCC10 rela-
tion, which means that x is located in the fiat container created by refO and
relRCC10 . E.g., ‘location distance(chair1 , desk1 ) = near ’ means “chair1 is lo-
cated in the near fiat container of desk1”. ‘location orientation(x , refO) = relORI ’
is a function that returns an orientation relation, which means that x is lo-
cated in the fiat container created by refO and relORI . E.g., ‘location orientation
(chair1 , desk1 ) = front ’ means “chair1 is located in the front fiat container of
desk1”.
5.3 Postures as Orientations
The posture of an object refers to how it is located, e.g., it faces to the reference
object or backs to it. The posture of an object to its reference object can be
interpreted as the orientation of the reference object to the object. For example,
“the chair faces towards the desk” is interpreted as “the desk is in front of the
chair”; if now the chair turns back to the desk, then it is interpreted as “the
desk is behind the chair”.
5.4 To Continue the Example
Suppose the spatial relations in the linguistic descriptions in §4.3 are formalized
in Table 1, then, the fiat containers are:
Sroom(PO).objects = {window, door}, Sroom(TPP).objects = {bookshelf, table}
Swindow(FR).objects = {door}, Swindow(NR).objects = {writingdesk, bookshelf}
Sdoor(FR).objects = {window}, Sdoor(Left).objects = {couch}
Sdoor(Right).objects = {table}, Swritingdesk(Front).objects = {balloon}
Scouch(Front).objects = {teatable}
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Table 1. Formal representations of spatial relations in the spatial linguistic descriptions
descriptions relation type formal relation
The door is in the wall in RCC10 PO
and opposite to the window opposite to RCC10 FR
the window is in the wall in RCC10 PO
and opposite to the door opposite to RCC10 FR
the writing-desk is next next to RCC10 NR
to the window
the bookshelf is close to the wall close to RCC10 TPP
and near the window near RCC10 NR
the couch is on the left on the left ORIENTATION Left
of the door
the balloon is in front of in front of ORIENTATION Front
the writing-desk
the table is near the wall near RCC10 TPP
and on the right, if you come on the right ORIENTATION Right
through the door
the tea-table is before before ORIENTATION Front
the couch
6 The Spatial Oriented Recognition Process
Generally speaking, the SPAN structure of a spatial environment is indetermi-
nate in the sense that the movements of spatial objects inside are unpredictable.
The exact traces of cars and people on the streets are unpredictable at a given
time; the exact locations of books, flowers are unpredictable on the next day.
Recognizing spatial environments is not a problem of whether the perceived
SNAP participates in the expected SPAN of the environment, rather a problem
of whether two SNAPs can participate in the same SPAN of the environment.
One relates to the spatial environment before the eyes; the other is the one in
the memory.
Considering the variability of vista spatial environments, the recognition
problem is refined as follows: recognizing a vista spatial environment means
that the perceived vista spatial environment is compatible to the one in mind;
which means that the layout of the perceived environment can be easily changed
into the layout of the one in mind.
Relating to different stabilities (correspond to different levels in the hierar-
chy) of fiat boundaries, their easiness of spatial changes differs accordingly. For
example, spatial changes of a room are extremely difficult or impossible; loca-
tion changes of windows or doors are also extremely difficult and in most cases
impossible; location changes of desks or shelves are difficult, though possible;
location changes of chairs or sitting balls are easy; location changes of books are
so easy that they do not help to recognize the spatial environment.
Two CogMs are not compatible, when there are spatial differences between
objects in the top two levels in hierarchy; two CogMs might be compatible,
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when there are no spatial differences between objects in the top two levels and
there are spatial differences between objects in the third level; two CogMs are
compatible, when there are no spatial differences between objects in the top
three levels and there are spatial differences between objects in the fourth level;
two CogMs are very compatible, when there are no spatial differences in the
top four levels.
6.1 The Qualitative Creation or Destruction
Following (Grenon and Smith, 2004) there are fiat boundaries in the perceived
CogM that are not in the memorized CogM , namely qualitative creation, such
as a new chair, new flowers, etc. There are fiat boundaries in the memorized
CogM but not in the perceived CogM , namely qualitative destruction, such
as chairs are moved out, flowers withered and thrown away. Comparison of fiat
boundaries is at the basic category level, which means that fiat boundaries of
the same basic level category are indistinguishable in isolation, though they are
made of different atoms and that entities of different basic level category are
distinguishable.
A set of fiat boundaries F determines a set of basic level categories BF such
that for each element b ∈ BF there is f ∈ F such that Constituent(f, b) and for
each element f ∈ F its basic level category is in BF . The sets F and BF further
determine the characteristic category set BCF by replacing each element b ∈ BF
with the pair (b, nb), where nb is the number of elements in F which are of the
basic level category b. For example, F = {chair1, chair2, chair3, desk1, desk2},
then BF = {CHAIR, DESK}, BCF = {(CHAIR, 3), (DESK, 2)}.
‘=blc’ stands for the basic level equal between two sets of fiat boundaries. Let
F1, F2 be two sets of fiat boundaries, they are at basic level equal, if and only if
their characteristic category sets are equal. That is, F1 =blc F2 iff BCF1 = BCF2 .
‘
’ stands for the basic level minus between one set and one element. Let F
be a set of fiat boundaries: F = {f1, f2, f3, · · · , fn} and f ′ /∈ F .
F 
 f ′ = (20)
ιFresult(∃f, w|f ∈ F ∧ BasicLevel(w) ∧ Constituent(f, w)
∧Constituent(f ′, w) • Fresult = F − {f})
‘ιy(p)’: ‘ι’ is the descriptor, ‘ιy(p)’ means such y that satisfies p. Though F 
 f ′
may result in different set of fiat boundaries, they have a unique characteristic
category set.
The basic level minus between two sets F and F ′ is defined as:
F 
 ∅ = F (21)
F 
 F ′ = ιFresult(∃f ∈ F ′ • Fresult = (F 
 f) 
 (F ′ − {f})) (22)
‘AppearOrDisappear(F1, F2)’ stands for “qualitative creations and destructions
between F1 and F2”.
AppearOrDisappear(F1, F2) = F1 
 F2 ∪ F2 
 F1
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6.2 Qualitative Spatial Changes
There are fiat boundaries in the perceived CogM that are located differently
in the memorized CogM , such as chairs are moved from near the desk to near
the shelf. As fiat boundaries are located in fiat containers created by reference
objects in the upper level or the same level, finding location change is pursued by
checking whether there are qualitative creations or destructions in fiat containers
created by peer objects with the same spatial relation.
Two fiat containers are peer fiat containers, if and only if the two reference
objects are of the same basic level category and the two relations are the same.
Suppose that fiat containers shown in §5.4 are of the remembered environment
and that fiat containers of the current perceived environment are as follows:
Sroom2(PO).objects = {window2, door2}
Sroom2(TPP).objects = {bookshelf2, table2}, Swindow2(FR).objects = {door2}
Swindow2(NR).objects = {writingdesk2, bookshelf2}
Sdoor2(FR).objects = {window2}, Sdoor2(Right).objects = {table2, couch2}
Sdoor2(Left).objects = {couch2}, Scouch2(Front).objects = {teatable2, balloon2}
Then, peer fiat containers are:
Sroom(PO) and Sroom2(PO), Sroom(TPP) and Sroom2(TPP),
Swindow(FR) and Swindow2(FR), Swindow(NR) and Swindow2(NR),
Sdoor(FR) and Sdoor2(FR), Sdoor(Right) and Sdoor2(Right),
Sdoor(Left) and Sdoor2(Left), Scouch(Front) and Scouch2(Front)
‘ExistingSpatialChange(CogM1, CogM2)’ stands for “there are qualitative
creations or destructions between the two cognitive maps CogM1 and CogM2. It
returns the union of the object sets of all the qualitative creations or destructions
of their peer fiat containers and non-peered fiat containers in CogM1 and CogM2.
For example, let CogMRS be the cognitive map of the remembered scenario
whose partial order lattice is shown in §4.3 and fiat containers are shown in §5.4,
CogMPS be the cognitive map of the perceived scenario whose fiat containers











= {window, door} 














 {window2} ∪ {window2} 
 {window}
∪{table} 
 {table2} ∪ {table2} 
 {table}
∪{teatable} 
 {teatable2, balloon2} ∪ {teatable2, balloon2} 
 {teatable}
∪{couch} 
 {couch2} ∪ {couch2} 
 {couch} ∪ {balloon}
= {balloon2} ∪ {balloon}
= {balloon2, balloon}
6.3 The Process of Recognizing Spatial Environments
The recognition process is active and top-down. Active means that when we go
into a vista spatial environment, we have an anticipation of which vista spatial
environment it should be. Thus, we have the SNAPVis and the SPANVis of
the expected environment in mind, represented by CogMrem. Top-down means
that spatial objects in the perceived SNAPVis are checked from the top level
downwards in the hierarchy.
Let CogMrem and CogMper be the cognitive map remembered and the cog-
nitive map perceived, plrem and plper be the partial order lattices of the two
cognitive maps, respectively.
The perceived CogM cannot be compatible with the remembered, if there
are any spatial differences of non-movable objects. These objects are located at




∩((top level plrem) ∪ (second level plrem))) = ∅
∨(ExistingSpatialChanges(CogMrem, CogMper)
∩((top level plper) ∪ (second level plper))) = ∅
The perceived CogM might be compatible with the remembered, if there are
no spatial differences of non-movable objects and there are spatial differences





∩((third level plrem) ∪ (third level plper))) = ∅
The perceived CogM are compatible with the remembered, if there are nei-
ther spatial differences of non-movable objects nor spatial differences of big fur-
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niture and there are spatial differences of small pieces of furniture which are at






∩((fourth level plrem) ∪ (fourth level plper))) = ∅
The perceived SNAPVis are very compatible with the remembered, if there







∩((fourth level plrem) ∪ (fourth level plper))) = ∅
Suppose the top four levels of partial order lattice of CogMPS in §6.2 are
as follows: top level(plPS) = {room2}, second level(plPS) = {window2, door2},
third level(plPS) = {writingdesk2, bookshelf2, table2, couch2}, fourth level
(plPS) = {balloon2, teatable2}, then the perceived scenario is compatible with
the remembered one:
NotCompatible(CogMRS , CogMPS)
def= (ExistingSpatialChanges(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∩((top level plRS) ∪ (second level plRS))) = ∅
∨(ExistingSpatialChanges(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∩((top level plPS) ∪ (second level plPS))) = ∅
≡ {balloon2, balloon} ∩ ({room} ∪ {window, door}) = ∅
∨{balloon2, balloon} ∩ ({room2} ∪ {window2, door2}) = ∅
≡ F
MightCompatible(CogMRS , CogMPS)
def= ¬NotCompatible(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∧(ExistingSpatialChanges(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∩((third level plRS) ∪ (third level plPS))) = ∅
≡ ¬F ∧ {balloon2, balloon} ∩ ({writingdesk, bookshelf, table, couch}




def= ¬NotCompatible(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∧¬MightCompatible(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∧(ExistingSpatialChanges(CogMRS , CogMPS)
∩((fourth level plRS) ∪ (fourth level plPS))) = ∅
≡ ¬F ∧ ¬F ∧ {balloon2, balloon} ∩ ({balloon, teatable}
∪{balloon2, teatable2}) = ∅
≡ T
A symbolic simulation system, the LIVE model, has been successfully imple-
mented in Lisp. One example is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. The sitting-ball in Mr. Bertel’s room has been changed a little; its partial order
lattice changes accordingly. The recognition process shows that it is Mr. Bertel’s room
notwithstanding. “to be very likely the same” means: to be the same in most cases
7 Conclusions
This article presents basic formal ontologies for recognizing vista spatial envi-
ronments. The basic topic in vista spatial cognition is how to define spatial
relations between extended objects. Qualitative distance relations are defined as
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the “connectedness” relations between the location object and the near region of
the reference object; qualitative orientation relations are defined as the “connect-
edness” relations between the location object and the fiat parts of the reference
object. The SNAPVis ontologies are, therefore, constructed by regions occupied
by extended objects and the connectedness relations between fiat regions de-
termined by extended objects and human cognition. The stability (a SPANVis
ontology) is introduced through the observation of the asymmetry between the
location object and its reference object in spatial linguistic descriptions. The ba-
sic task of vista spatial cognition is how to recognize variable vista environments.
This article proposes that recognizing vista spatial environments is the problem
of the compatibility between the remembered environment and the perceived
environment, which is determined by spatial differences and stabilities of related
objects.
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A Formal Definitions
This appendix presents simple descriptions of three basic terminologies: the near
extension, the near region, and the extension region.
Regions are denoted by mathcal capital letters, such as A, B, C, . . . . Regions
belong to classes and the classes of regions are denoted by typewriter capital
letters, such as A, B, C, . . . .
A.1 Primitives and Postulates
The ‘Region’ is Primitive. A “region” refers to the space that is occupied by
an extended object5. This is not a definition of regions, rather how it is under-
stood. A “region” has the following properties, which are used as postulates.
The Postulate of Categories. Humans are preferable to recognize single ob-
jects at the basic level category. Accordingly, a “region” belongs to a class. “CL”
stands for the set of all the classes of regions that a person has.
Axiom-CL 1. CL is non-empty.
CL = ∅
For any recognized object, it belongs to one and only one element in CL.
Axiom-CL 2. Any region belongs to a class which is an element of CL.
∀A∃A|A ∈ CL • A ∈ A
Axiom-CL 3. Any region belongs to only one element in CL.
∀A, A, B|A ∈ CL ∧ B ∈ CL • A ∈ A ∧ A ∈ B → A = B
5 By “an object”, I do not exclude objects, such as a hole, or a niche. Thus, the “region”
here refers to the space occupied by a conceptual object, rather than substances.
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‘Connectedness’ is Primitive. The only primitive relation between regions
is “connected with”: C.
A.2 The Near Extension, the Near Region
Let A (of the class A ∈ CL) and X (of the class X ∈ CL) be two regions. The
near extension of A by X , written as AX , refers to the sum of all regions of the
class X that are connected with the region A. X is called the extension region.
Formally, the near extension of A by X can be defined as the region Y such
that, given any region W, W connects with Y if and only if W connects with a
certain region V of the class X such that V connects A.
AX def= (27)
ιY(∀W • (C(W,Y) ≡ ∃V|V ∈ X ∧ X ∈ X ∧ X ∈ CL • C(A,V) ∧ C(W,V)))
The near region of A by X , written as N XA , can be defined as the difference of
AX with A: N XA = diff(AX ,A), diff following (Randell et al., 1992).
AX and N XA are also regions, therefore, according to Axiom-CL 2 and
Axiom-CL 3 each belongs to one and only one class, which is an element of
CL. The class of AX is written as AX, the class of N XA is written as NXA.
The set CL is, therefore, expanded as follows: if X ∈ CL and Y ∈ CL, then XX,
XY and NXY are also elements of CL. For example, suppose that BIF ∈ CL represents
the British imperial foot, then BIFBIF
BIF ∈ CL, which represents the class of the
yard, see §A.3.
A.3 The Extension Regions
The near extension of A by X depends on the class of X , not on the particular X .
For example, British people select their imperial foot as the extension region
(the British imperial foot) to measure distance. The British unit of distance were
the yard (a yard equals to three feet), and the fathom (a fathom equals to six
feet). The British imperial foot is used as the class whose elements have the
same length as the British imperial foot. The old French unit of distance was
the Paris feet and the toise (a toise equals to six Paris feet).
Ancient Egyptians used the “Royal Egyptian Cubit” as the extension region,
which was equal to “the length of the forearm from the bent elbow to the tip of
the extended middle finger plus the width of the palm of the hand of the Pharaoh
or King ruling at that time”6. When ancient Egyptians said that the width of the
door was less than five Cubits, it meant that five connected objects (each has the
size of “Royal Egyptian Cubit”) can connect the two sides of the door. Therefore,
the “Royal Egyptian Cubit” was used as the class whose elements have the same
length as the Pharaoh’s forearm, rather than the concrete Pharaoh’s forearm
with extended middle finger.
6 http://www.ncsli.org/misc/cubit.cfm
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The old German unit of distance7 were Elle, the double feet series, a day’s
journey, etc. The Elle was similar to the “Royal Egyptian Cubit” which was
defined as the segment between the bent elbow and the point of extended middle
finger; the double feet series used two connected feet as the length-unit, such as
Frankfurt double feet, Oldenburg double feet, Bavaria double feet, Vienna double
feet, even Hamburg short double feet, Hamburg long double feet, etc.; a day’s
journey was defined as the distance that can be covered, especially by a horse
with cart, in one day8. If the horse with cart is replaced with the light and one
day is replaced with one year, then we have an extension region in the modern
physics—the lightyear that is the distance that light travels in one year.
Ancient Chinese used Du, Cun, Chi, etc. as the extension regions. A Du was
“two consecutive steps by different legs of a person”9. When ancient Chinese
measured the length of a road by Du, they walked along the road and some of
their steps would be inevitably a little bit different from others. Du was, there-
fore, used as the class of all two consecutive steps of a person. Cun is the body
segment between the wrist striation behind the thumb and the pulsing point
of the radial artery10; Chi is the body segment between the wrist striation and
the striation at the acupuncture point called “Qu-Chi” in Chinese medicine11.
Therefore, Cun and Chi are used as classes whose members differ person from
person.
7 http://matheboard.de/lexikon/Hauptseite,definition.htm
8 Tagereise: einen Tag dauernde Reise (bes. mit Pferd u. Wagen).
9 Personal communication with Shou-Ren Lu.
10 The definitions of ‘Chi’ and ‘Cun’ in Shuo Wen Jie Zi (Origin of Chinese Charac-
ters), by XU Shen (58-147 AD) of the Eastern Han Dynasty.
11 Personal communication with Shou-Ren Lu.
